20 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
Full Idea: There are some proposals for non-well-founded set theory (tolerating cases of self-membership and membership circularities). | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Aczel 1988, and Barwise and Moss 1996] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It is common in mereology to hold that there is something of which everything is part, but few hold that there is a 'null entity' that is part of everything. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This comes out as roughly the opposite of set theory, which cannot do without the null set, but is not keen on the set of everything. |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
Full Idea: While mereology was originally offered with a nominalist viewpoint, resulting in a conception of mereology as an ontologically parsimonious alternative to set theory, there is no necessary link between analysis of parthood and nominalism. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Lesniewski and Leonard-and-Goodman. Do you allow something called a 'whole' into your ontology, as well as the parts? He observes that while 'wholes' can be concrete, they can also be abstract, if the parts are abstract. |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It is an open question whether there are any mereological atoms (with no proper parts), and also whether every object is ultimately made up of atoms. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3) | |
A reaction: Such a view would have to presuppose (metaphysically) that the divisibility of matter has limits. If one follows this route, then are there only 'natural' wholes, or are we 'unrestricted' in our view of how the atoms combine? I favour the natural route. |
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: A natural principle is the same kind of paradox will have the same kind of solution. Standardly Ramsey's first group are solved by denying the existence of some totality, and the second group are less clear. But denial of the groups sink both. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This sums up the argument of Priest's paper, which is that it is Ramsey's division into two kinds (see Idea 13334) which is preventing us from getting to grips with the paradoxes. Priest, notoriously, just lives with them. |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: König: there are indefinable ordinals, and the least indefinable ordinal has just been defined in that very phrase. (Recall that something is definable iff there is a (non-indexical) noun-phrase that refers to it). | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: Priest makes great subsequent use of this one, but it feels like a card trick. 'Everything indefinable has now been defined' (by the subject of this sentence)? König, of course, does manage to pick out one particular object. |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Berry: if we take 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words', we can generate a number which is and is not one of these numbers. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: [not enough space to spell this one out in full] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Richard: φ(x) is 'x is a definable real number between 0 and 1' and ψ(x) is 'x is definable'. We can define a real by diagonalization so that it is not in x. It is and isn't in the set of reals. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
A reaction: [this isn't fully clear here because it is compressed] |
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Burali-Forti: φ(x) is 'x is an ordinal', and so w is the set of all ordinals, On; δ(x) is the least ordinal greater than every member of x (abbreviation: log(x)). The contradiction is that log(On)∈On and log(On)∉On. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: Mirimanoff: φ(x) is 'x is well founded', so that w is the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V; &delta(x) is just the power set of x, P(x). If x⊆V, then V∈V and V∉V, since δ(V) is just V itself. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: In the family of the Liar is the Knower Paradox, where φ(x) is 'x is known to be true', and there is a set of known things, Kn. By knowing a sentence is not in the known sentences, you know its truth. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
A reaction: [mostly my wording] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
Full Idea: There are liar chains which fit the pattern of Transcendence and Closure, as can be seen with the simplest case of the Liar Pair. | |
From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
A reaction: [Priest gives full details] Priest's idea is that Closure is when a set is announced as complete, and Transcendence is when the set is forced to expand. He claims that the two keep coming into conflict. |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
Full Idea: The thesis known as 'composition is identity' is that identity is mereological composition; a fusion is just the parts counted loosely, but it is strictly a multitude and loosely a single thing. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites D.Baxter 1988, in Mind] It is not clear, from this simple statement, what the difference is between multitudes that are parts of a thing, and multitudes that are not. A heavy weight seems to hang on the notion of 'composed of'. |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
Full Idea: With a basic parthood relation, we can formally define various mereological predicates, such as overlap, underlap, proper part, over-crossing, under-crossing, proper overlap, and proper underlap. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [Varzi offers some diagrams, but they need interpretation] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
Full Idea: The word 'part' can used whether it is attached, or arbitrarily demarcated, or gerrymandered, or immaterial, or unextended, or spatial, or temporal. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1) |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
Full Idea: It seems obvious that 'part' stands for a partial ordering, a reflexive ('everything is part of itself'), antisymmetic ('two things cannot be part of each other'), and transitive (a part of a part of a thing is part of that thing) relation. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: I'm never clear why the reflexive bit of the relation should be taken as 'obvious', since it seems to defy normal usage and common sense. It would be absurd to say 'I'll give you part of the cake' and hand you the whole of it. See Idea 10651. |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
Full Idea: Taking reflexivity as constitutive of the meaning of 'part' amounts to regarding identity as a limit case of parthood. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: A nice thought, but it is horribly 'philosophical', and a long way from ordinary usage and common sense (which is, I'm sorry to say, a BAD thing). |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
Full Idea: We might say that sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity, as some entities may differ exclusively with respect to the arrangement of the parts, as when we compare 'John loves Mary' with 'Mary loves John'. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably wide dispersal should also prevent parts from fixing wholes, but there is so much vagueness here that it is tempting to go for unrestricted composition, and then work back to the common sense position. |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
Full Idea: Conceivability may well be a guide to possibility, but literary fantasy is by itself no evidence of conceivability. | |
From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Very nice. People who cite 'conceivability' in this context often have a disgracefully loose usage for the word. Really, really conceivable is probably our only guide to possibility. |
4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation. | |
From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1) | |
A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings. |