Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Pierre Bayle', 'Collins Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'Identity through Possible Worlds'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that if Adam does have essential properties, there is no procedure at all for finding out what they are.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (Identity through Possible Worlds [1967], p.85)
     A reaction: My tentative suggestion is that the essential properties are those which explain the nature, power, function and role of Adam in the 'actual' world. Whatever possibilities he acquires, he had better retain the capacity to be the First Man.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: If Adam lived for 931 years in a possible world, instead of his actual 930 years, ..then Adam and Noah could gradually exchange their ages and other properties...and we could trace Adam in a world back to the actual Noah, and vice versa.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (Identity through Possible Worlds [1967], p.81-2)
     A reaction: [very compressed] Chisholm was one of the first to raise this problem for possible worlds, though it had been Quine's objection to modal logic all along. Only Adam having essential properties seems to stop this slippery slope, says Chisholm.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey]
     Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent.
     From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266)
     A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The more perfect one is, the more one is determined to the good, and so is more free at the same time. ...Our power and knowledge are more extended, and our will much the more limited within the bounds of perfect reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Pierre Bayle [1702], 1702)
     A reaction: I like this idea, which seems to me to derive from Aquinas. When I choose to eat and drink each day, or agree that 7+5 is 12, I don't complain about my lack of freedom in the choices. Goodness and reason are constraints I welcome.