27 ideas
6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |