9 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
16707 | Cold and hot are the swiftness and slowness of corpuscular motion [Beeckman] |