58 ideas
14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |