Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices', 'Intensions Revisited' and 'Epistemic Justification'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]