Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essential Attribution', 'What is a Leading Principle?' and 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix'

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21 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]