28 ideas
| 11193 | Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna] |
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| 14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
| 14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
| 14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
| 14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
| 14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
| 14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
| 11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
| 11204 | The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna] |
| 15036 | An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio] |
| 14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |