Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Charles Sanders Peirce and Thomas Hobbes

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Everything worth notice is worth recording; and those records should be so made that they can readily be arranged, and particularly so that they can be rearranged.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V)
     A reaction: Yet another epigraph for my project! Peirce must have had a study piled with labelled notes, and he would have adored this database, at least in its theory.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Philosophy differs from the special sciences in not confining itself to the reality of existence, but also to the reality of potential being.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
     A reaction: One might reply that sciences also concern potential being, if their output is universal generalisations (such as 'laws'). I take disposition and powers to be central to existence, which are hence of interest to sciences.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: In beginning philosophy, the first beginning is from definitions.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 1.6.15)
     A reaction: Note that he doesn't say that definitions are the aim of philosophy, as some analysts might think.
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as an absolutely detached idea. It would be no idea at all. For an idea is itself a continuous system.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], III)
     A reaction: This is the new anti-epigraph for this database. This idea is part of Peirce's idea that relations are the central feature of our grasp of the world.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Philosophy differs from mathematics in being a search for real truth.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
     A reaction: This is important, coming from the founder of pragmatism, in rejecting the anti-realism which a lot of modern pragmatists seem to like.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.IX.13)
     A reaction: Laughter tends to involve something unusual. We don't just burst out with a glory of vanity whenever we meet some inferiority in another person.