Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, David M. Armstrong and Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom

7278	Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
	Full Idea: Words of wisdom are precise and clear.
	From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
	A reaction: I can only approve of this. The issue of clarity is much discussed amongs philosophers, especially in the analytic v continental debate. Note, therefore, the additional requirement to be 'precise'. Should we be less clear in order to be precise?

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy

7281	Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
	Full Idea: Don't even start, let's just stay put.
	From: Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) (The Book of Chuang Tzu [c.329 BCE], Ch.2)
	A reaction: What a remarkable proposal! He seems frightened to make an omelette, because he will have to break an egg, or he might burn himself. I can't relate to this idea, but it's existence must be noted, like other scepticisms.

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

18390	All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: My plea, whatever conclusions are drawn, is to control the metaphysical discussion by continual reference to suggested truthmakers.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.7)
	A reaction: ...And my plea is to control metaethical discussion by continual reference to value-makers. In general, this is the approach which will deliver a unified account of the world. Truthmakers are the ideal restraint on extravagant metaphysics.

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis

17663	If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Paradox of Analysis:if we ask what sort of thing an X is, then either we know what an X is or we do not. If we know then there is no need to ask the question. If we do not know then there is no way to begin the investigation. It's pointless or impossible
	From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2)
	A reaction: [G.E. Moore is the source of this, somewhere] Plato worried that to get to know something you must already know it. Solving this requires the concept of a 'benign' circularity.