display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
25 ideas
| 7536 | If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: When Wittgenstein was once asked what one can do to improve the world, he replied: 'Improve yourself; that is the only thing you can do to improve the world'. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (talk [1935]), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Ghost of Madness Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This is rather startlingly pessimistic about politics, and I don't really believe it. If anything has ever improved me, it has usually come from the world, and been created by other people. |
| 16010 | While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Culture and Value [1945], 53e) | |
| A reaction: [Idea from SY] Personally I don't agree that wisdom is passionless. At the very least, Aristotle allows the wise person to be appropriately angry. [PG] |
| 18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If philosophy were a matter of choice between rival theories, then it would be sound to teach it historically. But if it is not, then it is a fault to teach it historically, because it is quite unnecessary; we can tackle the subject direct. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C V A) | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein was a bit notorious for not knowing the history of the subject terribly well, and this explains why. Presumably our tackling the subject direct will not have the dreadful consequence of producing yet another theory. |
| 2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 7) | |
| A reaction: This is either a boring truism, or points towards some sort of verificationism (where we can speak meaninglessly). Compare Ideas 7973 and 6870. |
| 2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas; that is what makes him a philosopher. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], 455) | |
| A reaction: A bit surprising from the man who gave us 'language games' and 'private language argument'. |
| 2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Philosophical problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have already known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §109), quoted by Jerrold J. Katz - Realistic Rationalism Int.xi | |
| A reaction: A philosophical dispute can be settled by a piece of information, which may be already known to you, but new to me. Philosophical discussion can also point to a scientific research programme - i.e. a need for new information. I like the first sentence. |
| 7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The 'Tractatus' concerns the theory of what can be expressed by propositions (and, which comes to the same thing, can be thought), and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but can only be shown; which, I believe, is the main problem of philosophy. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This contains what a I consider the heresy of making thought depend on language, but his main question remains, of the limits of thought. It is dramatised nicely in the 'mysterian' view of the mind-body problem (e.g. Idea 2540). |
| 6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I recognise the incredible force of Wittgenstein's closing statement in the 'Tractatus', but I hold the opposite view: philosophy exists to give expression to that which we think we can only remain silent about. | |
| From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 7) by Keith Ansell Pearson - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.267 | |
| A reaction: A wonderful remark, with which I totally agree. Compare Idea 1596. I think it is just a fact that philosophers are able to articulate a huge number of ideas which other intelligent people find very interesting but on which they are unable to speak. |
| 18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This 'philosophical' puzzlement is one of the intellect and not of instinct. Philosophical puzzles are irrelevant to our every-day life. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], A I.1) | |
| A reaction: All enquiry begins with puzzles, and they are cured by explanations, which result in understanding. In that sense he is right. I entirely disagree that the puzzles are irrelevant to daily life. |
| 2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 6.5) | |
| A reaction: Just the sort of unsubstantiated metaphysical claim that philosophers are always making. |
| 9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The 'Tractatus' is without doubt one of the masterpieces of anti-philosophy. | |
| From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by Alain Badiou - Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little p.16 | |
| A reaction: French philosophers do love making wicked remarks like that. It seems that analysis is anti-philosophy, or 'little' philosophy in Badiou's parlance. |
| 23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. ….and this work shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This is LW's deep pessimism about the value of philosophy, right from the start. You can only idolise LW if you agree with him on this. |
| 23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who understands me eventually recognises my propositions as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 6.54) | |
| A reaction: A much discussed passage. It can't possibly say that his book is pointless, because you can't attain this recognition without climbing his ladder. He speaks like an eastern guru. Perhaps Hume should have ended 'so commit my book to the flames'? |
| 18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers as 'Why?' and 'What?' without knowing clearly what their questions are. They are expressing a feeling of mental uneasiness. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B I.1) | |
| A reaction: He suggests it is childish to express puzzlement, instead of asking for precise information. How odd. All enquiries start with vague puzzlement, which gradually comes into focus, or else is abandoned. |
| 4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §309) | |
| A reaction: Ridiculous. Trying to think about thought is not a pointless buzzing - it is an attempt by humans to become like gods. |
| 2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The limits of my language means the limits of my world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.6) | |
| A reaction: This is dangerous rubbish. For a start, if you accept (as you should) the existence of propositions, our heads are full of unarticulated ones. And truth emerges by degrees from what cannot be articulated. |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Analysis makes the statement more complicated than it was; but it cannot and ought not to make it more complicated than its meaning (Bedeutung) was to begin with. When the statement is as complex as its meaning, then it is completely analysed. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 46e) | |
| A reaction: But how do you assess how complex the 'Bedeutung' was before you started? |
| 6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.0201) | |
| A reaction: Russell says this embodies Wittgenstein's belief in analysis. Obviously Wittgenstein is making this claim 'in principle', as life is very short, and people are rather dim. I don't know how to begin evaluating such a claim. |
| 23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.002) | |
| A reaction: It is normally assumed that ordinary language philosophy was derived from the later Wittgenstein, but this para in the Tractatus seems to contain the germ of the idea. He is pessimistic about finding logical forms. |
| 23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.003) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what the scope of 'logic' is here. I suppose it means everything about language which is expounded in the Tractatus. I assume this includes Plato and Aristotle? I don't think I agree. It's about concepts, not about logic. |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is nonsense to try to find a theory of truth, because we can see that in everyday life we use the word quite clearly and definitely in various different senses. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C V B) | |
| A reaction: This was a year before Tarski published his famous theory of truth for formal languages. Prior to that, most philosophers were giving up on truth. Would he say the same about 'gravity' or 'inflation'? |
| 22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], 116), quoted by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 7 n16 | |
| A reaction: A germ of ordinary language philosophy. It is wrong to think that metaphysics must be studied in the usages of ordinary language, but I strongly believe that words like 'essence' or 'objectivity' should retain their normal meaning when philosophising. |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In philosophy we know already all that we want to know; philosophical analysis does not give us any new facts. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B V.1) |
| 23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This also provides the last sentence of his book. I think this is an axiom of modern analytic philosophy. The dream is to clarify everything, and belief that this is possible puts logic centre-stage, as the most precise language available. |
| 23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences). | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.11) | |
| A reaction: So if it is true, it is science. What about truths about science? What about true speculations beyond science? What about bad science? What about trivial everyday truths? This is said to be a rare precursor of logical positivism in Tractatus. |