Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Douglas Lackey, T.H. Green and G.E. Moore

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The rejection of idealism by Moore and Russell was marked in 1898 by the publication of Moore's article 'The Nature of Judgement'.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This now looks like a huge landmark in the history of British philosophy.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
23027 Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
     Full Idea: To T.H. Green an ideal was no creation of an idle imagination, metaphysics no mere play of the speculative reason. Ideals were the most solid, and metaphysics the most practical thing about a man.
     From: report of T.H. Green (works [1875]) by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State I
     A reaction: This is despite the fact that Green was an idealist in the Hegelian tradition. I like this. I see it not just as ideals having practical guiding influence, but also that ideals themselves arising out of experience.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
17992 The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that the most important and interesting thing which philosophers have tried to do ...is to give a general description of the whole of the Universe.
     From: G.E. Moore (Some Main Problems of Philosophy [1911], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: He adds that they aim to show what is in it, and what might be in it, and how the two relate. This sort of big view is the one I favour. I think the hallmark of philosophical thought is a high level of generality. He next proceeds to defend common sense.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
     Full Idea: For Moore and Russell analysis is not - as is commonly understood now - a linguistic activity, but an ontological one. To analyse a proposition is not to investigate language, but to carve up the world so that it begins to make some sort of sense.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
     A reaction: A thought dear to my heart. The twentieth century got horribly side-tracked into thinking that ontology was an entirely linguistic problem. I suggest that physicists analyse physical reality, and philosophers analyse abstract reality.