Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Kit Fine and Henry of Ghent

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics has two main areas of concern: one is with the nature of things, with what they are; and the other is with the existence of things, with whether they are.
     From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I)
     A reaction: This paper is part of a movement which has shifted metaphysics to a third target - how things relate to one another. The possibility that this third aim should be the main one seems quite plausible to me.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If there is no way of settling metaphysical questions, then who cares whether or not they make sense?
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4 n20)
     A reaction: This footnote is aimed at logical positivists, who seemed to worry about whether metaphysics made sense, and also dismissed its prospects even if it did make sense.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: We may broadly distinguish between two main branches of metaphysics: the 'realist' or 'critical' branch is concerned with what is real (tense, values, numbers); the 'naive' or 'pre-critical' branch concerns natures of things irrespective of reality.
     From: Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02)
     A reaction: [compressed] The 'natures' of things are presumably the essences. He cites 3D v 4D objects, and the status of fictional characters, as examples of the second type. Fine says ground is central to realist metaphysics.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The 'quietist' view of metaphysics says that realist metaphysics should be abandoned, not because its questions cannot be framed, but because their answers cannot be found. The real world of metaphysics is akin to Kant's noumenal world.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 4)
     A reaction: [He cites Blackburn, Dworkin, A.Fine, and Putnam-1987 as quietists] Fine aims to clarify the concepts of factuality and of ground, in order to show that metaphysics is possible.