Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Michel de Montaigne and Frank Jackson

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Why cannot a wise man dare to doubt anything and everything?
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0562)
     A reaction: This question seems to be the start of the Enlightenment Project, of attempting to prove everything. MacIntyre warns of the dangers of this in ethical theory. The story of modern philosophy is the discovery of its impossibility. E.g. Davidson on truth.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Take a beam wide enough to walk along: suspend it between two towers: there is no philosophical wisdom, however firm, which could make us walk along it just as we would if we were on the ground.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0672)
     A reaction: This proposes great scepticism about the practical application of philosophical wisdom, but if we talk in terms of the wise assessment of risk in any undertaking, our caution on the raised beam makes perfectly good sense.
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik]
     Full Idea: The first liberal, the founding father if we have one, is the great sixteenth century French essayist Michel de Montaigne.
     From: report of Michel de Montaigne (On Cruelty [1580]) by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 1
     A reaction: He says this not on the basis of his politicies or achievements, but his general attitudes and values. It may be another hundred years before we can identify another obvious liberal (Locke?).
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
     Full Idea: Serious metaphysics is committed to views about which sentences entail which other sentences.
     From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This does not say that metaphysics is only about entailment, or (even worse) only about sentences. Put another way: if we wish to be wise, we must study the implications of our beliefs. Yes.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
     Full Idea: Conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary.
     From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is a view of linguistic analysis as focusing on entailments rather than on usage or truth conditions. If philosophy is the attempt to acquire a totally consistent set of beliefs (a plausible view), then Jackson is right.
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
     Full Idea: Intuitions about possibilities are the bread and butter of conceptual analysis.
     From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Hence the centrality of the debate over conceivability and possibility. Which seems to reduce to the relationship between 'intuition' and 'imagination'. Imagination is a very weak guide to what is possible, and intuition is very uncertain....
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
     Full Idea: On the empiricist view of meaning, the relevance of conceptual analysis to metaphysics is that it establishes that a putative reduction respects the original meaning of the target expression.
     From: report of Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], p.28) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.2.4