Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Iamblichus and E.J. Lowe

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics can be judged as the mapping of possibilities.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 2.2
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber]
     Full Idea: Lowe argues that the sciences need metaphysics to discharge the assumptions that they simply made at the outset.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics 1.2
     A reaction: Hofweber doesn't buy this, and neither do I. I don't think science 'needs' metaphysics (or barely needs it), but I do think metaphysics needs a fair degree of science. It is high-level abstraction based on the facts.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The central task of metaphysics is to chart the possibilities of existence by identifying the categories of being and the relations of ontological dependency in which beings of different categories stand to one another.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: I am beginning to think that he is right about the second one, and that dependency and grounding relations are the name of the game. I don't have Lowe's confidence that philosophers can parcel up reality in neat and true ways.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2)
     A reaction: I think it is vital to hang on to this big definition, focusing on ontology, and not retreat (like Kant) to the epistemological question of how humans happen to see reality, even if we are stuck with being humans.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Only metaphysics can vindicate a judgement that a caterpillar survives to become a butterfly, but a pig does not survive to become pork, or that water survives as ice, but that paper does not survive as ash.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
     A reaction: The works of Lowe, and other modern heroes, have shown that these real questions can be pursued intensively into areas where no scientist, or even theologian, would dare to tread.
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I do not claim that metaphysics on its own can, in general, tell us what there is. Rather - to a first approximation - I hold that metaphysics by itself only tells us what there could be.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 1.3)
     A reaction: If there is going to be a modern defence of metaphysics, in an age dominated by empirical science, this sounds pretty good to me. Presumably it also says what there couldn't be. The challenge is to offer authority for any claims made.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It may well be that after all our attempts at analysis, we have to accept the notions of causality, identity and existence as being primitive and irreducible.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.191)
     A reaction: They may be irreducible, but it seems possible that the relationships between them might be revealed (as between Platonic Forms). To exist is to have identity and causal powers?
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The central task of philosophy is the cultivation of insights into natures or essences, and not the 'analysis of concepts', with which it is apt to be confused.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 1)
     A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a false dichotomy. I like the idea of trying to understand the true natures of things, but how are we going to do it in our armchairs?