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16931
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Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
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Full Idea:
The generation of knowledge a priori, both according to intuition and according to concepts, and finally the generation of synthetic propositions a priori in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential content of metaphysics.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 274)
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A reaction:
By 'concepts' he implies mere analytic thought, so 'intuition' is where the exciting bit is, and that is rather vague.
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7918
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Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Kant turned the question 'How is metaphysics possible?' into 'How is metaphysical knowledge possible?' He thus turned metaphysics into epistemology, obliterating Aristotle's distinction between being qua being and being qua known.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.1
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A reaction:
This makes Kant the number one villain in my philosophical pantheon, although the confusion of ontology and epistemology is found in Berkeley and others. Human speculations are not pointless, though they are difficult to verify.
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21462
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It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner]
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Full Idea:
Unusually, Kant's system has continued to seem possible, to some degree, to endorse as a whole, as opposed to an edifice that has most to offer by being dismantled.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Sebastian Gardner - Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason 10 Intro
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A reaction:
I think Aristotle passes this test, but Plato has to be dismantled. No one ever swallows Leibniz whole. I suppose Hume can be taken complete, but only because of his minimal commitments.
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5600
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Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant]
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Full Idea:
Human reason is by nature architectonic, i.e. it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system, and hence it permits only such principles as do not render an intended cognition incapable of standing together with others in some system.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B502/A474)
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A reaction:
Speak for yourself! However, there is no denying that the making connections seems basic to thought, and there is clearly an enticing magic in making lots of extended connections. Beautiful finished structures may, though, be coherent but false.
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21457
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Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant]
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Full Idea:
The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and thus contains the natural law as well as the moral law, initially in two separate systems, but ultimately in a single philosophical system.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B868/A840)
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A reaction:
Pure reason is for nature, and practical reason (which has priority) is for freedom and morality. There is a streak of religiosity in Kant which makes him give morality and normativity priority over truth and science.
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6584
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A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin]
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Full Idea:
Kant stresses that reason, when it turns dialectical, posits immutable basic entities; these are the standard inhabitants of traditional a priori metaphysics - God, souls, Platonic ideas, Democritean indestructible atoms, and the like.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3
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A reaction:
This sounds like a good warning, but it just invites the meta-question in a priori metaphysics 'Are we searching for something unchanging, or is this impossible?' Aristotle certainly addressed this question. The search strikes me as sensible.
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9349
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A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant]
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Full Idea:
The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space. ..Plato made no headway in the empty space of understanding; he had no resistance, no support.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B008/A5)
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A reaction:
Who says Kant can't write? This is the classic image of the excesses of metaphysics which Kant wished to curtail. His attacks culminates in the contempt of logical positivism for such things, but no one would now disagree with Kant on this.
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21408
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For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
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Full Idea:
A philosophy of any subject (a system of rational knowledge from concepts) requires a system of pure rational concepts independent of any conditions of intuition, that is, a metaphysics.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 375 Pref)
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A reaction:
'Pure rational concepts' must be a priori, and (in Kant's case) transcendental - i.e. discovered from the study of presuppositions. Does this actually say that the philosophies of science, biology, psychology, economics etc each needs a metaphysics?
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