Combining Philosophers

Ideas for John Perry, Richard Rorty and F.H. Bradley

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
     Full Idea: If we cannot check our language against non-linguistic awareness, then philosophy can never be more than a discussion of the utility and compatibility of beliefs - and, more particularly, of the various vocabularies in which those beliefs are formulated.
     From: Richard Rorty (Brandom on Social Practices and Representations [1998], iii.127), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.178
     A reaction: I'm amazed at how many people I encounter in philosophy circles (compared with none at all outside those circles) who seem to think that we cannot check our language against our non-linguistic awareness. Rorty is their guru. Weird.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
     Full Idea: Such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition as 'the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress' (F.H.Bradley) is not even in principle verifiable.
     From: comment on F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.1
     A reaction: One may jeer at the Verification Principle for either failing to be precise, or for failing to pass its own test, but Ayer still has a point here. When we drift off into sustained abstractions, we must keeping asking if we are still saying anything real.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct; but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.
     From: F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.165
     A reaction: A famous and very nice remark. The idea of believing things on instinct sounds more like David Hume than an idealist. Personally I am not so pessimistic about the enterprise. I think metaphysics is capable of changing what we believe.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
     Full Idea: There is nowadays little attempt to bring "analytic philosophy" to self-consciousness by explaining how to tell a successful from an unsuccessful analysis.
     From: Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 4.1)