display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
| 2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The limits of my language means the limits of my world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.6) | |
| A reaction: This is dangerous rubbish. For a start, if you accept (as you should) the existence of propositions, our heads are full of unarticulated ones. And truth emerges by degrees from what cannot be articulated. |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Analysis makes the statement more complicated than it was; but it cannot and ought not to make it more complicated than its meaning (Bedeutung) was to begin with. When the statement is as complex as its meaning, then it is completely analysed. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 46e) | |
| A reaction: But how do you assess how complex the 'Bedeutung' was before you started? |
| 6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.0201) | |
| A reaction: Russell says this embodies Wittgenstein's belief in analysis. Obviously Wittgenstein is making this claim 'in principle', as life is very short, and people are rather dim. I don't know how to begin evaluating such a claim. |
| 23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.002) | |
| A reaction: It is normally assumed that ordinary language philosophy was derived from the later Wittgenstein, but this para in the Tractatus seems to contain the germ of the idea. He is pessimistic about finding logical forms. |
| 23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.003) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what the scope of 'logic' is here. I suppose it means everything about language which is expounded in the Tractatus. I assume this includes Plato and Aristotle? I don't think I agree. It's about concepts, not about logic. |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is nonsense to try to find a theory of truth, because we can see that in everyday life we use the word quite clearly and definitely in various different senses. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C V B) | |
| A reaction: This was a year before Tarski published his famous theory of truth for formal languages. Prior to that, most philosophers were giving up on truth. Would he say the same about 'gravity' or 'inflation'? |
| 22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], 116), quoted by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 7 n16 | |
| A reaction: A germ of ordinary language philosophy. It is wrong to think that metaphysics must be studied in the usages of ordinary language, but I strongly believe that words like 'essence' or 'objectivity' should retain their normal meaning when philosophising. |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In philosophy we know already all that we want to know; philosophical analysis does not give us any new facts. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B V.1) |
| 23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This also provides the last sentence of his book. I think this is an axiom of modern analytic philosophy. The dream is to clarify everything, and belief that this is possible puts logic centre-stage, as the most precise language available. |