Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Charles Sanders Peirce and Simon Critchley

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
20455 Philosophy really got started as the rival mode of discourse to tragedy [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
19250 Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19228 Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
20446 Philosophy begins in disappointment, notably in religion and politics [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
19241 An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
19227 Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
6848 Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
6847 Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
19218 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
14799 Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
19229 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
14767 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
19231 Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14764 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
7068 If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
6844 Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
20449 Science gives us an excessively theoretical view of life [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
7075 To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
7069 The French keep returning, to Hegel or Nietzsche or Marx [Critchley]
6835 German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
6837 Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
6836 Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
6838 Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
6845 Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
6846 Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
20448 Phenomenology uncovers and redescribes the pre-theoretical layer of life [Critchley]