display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| Full Idea: It struck Kant (to put it crudely) that there are some things which are necessarily true of the world, revealed when we consider what is required for mathematics - indeed, thinking in general - to make sense. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Intro | |
| A reaction: This is given as background the Wittgenstein's Tractatus. He disagrees with Kant because logic is not synthetic. I see a strong connection with the stoic belief that the natural world is intrinsically rational. |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: The Kantian rationalist view is that what is necessary is always knowable a priori, and what is knowable a priori is always necessary. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.1 | |
| A reaction: Nice to get a clear spelling out of the two-way relationship here. Why couldn't Kant put it as clearly as this? See Kripke for the first big challenges to Kant's picture. I like aposteriori necessities. |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant maintained that metaphysics must be a body of necessary truths, and that necessary truths must be a priori, so metaphysical claims could not be justified by experience. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 3 | |
| A reaction: I'm coming to the view that there is no a priori necessity, and that all necessities are entailments from the nature of reality. The apparent a priori necessities are just at a very high level of abstraction. |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical propositions are always a priori judgments and are never empirical, because they carry necessity with them, which cannot be derived from experience. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B014) | |
| A reaction: Personally I like the idea that maths is the 'science of patterns', but then I take it that the features of patterns will be common to all possible worlds. Presumably a proposition could be contingent, and yet true in all possible worlds. |