Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaximander, Edwin D. Mares and John Stuart Mill

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3 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12190 Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
     Full Idea: That which is necessary, that which must be, means that which will be, whatever suppositions we may make in regard to all other things.
     From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.06.6)
     A reaction: [Mill discusses causal necessity] This is quoted by McFetridge. This slightly firms up the definition as 'what has to be true', though it makes it dependent on our 'suppositions'. Presumably nothing beyond our powers of supposition could matter either.
22623 Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
     Full Idea: If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is unconditionalness. That which is necessary, that which must be, means that which will be whatever supposition we make with regard to other things.
     From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], p.339 [1974 ed]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 5.3
     A reaction: 'It is necessary to leave now, if you want to catch the train' is a genuine type of necessity. Mill's type is probably Absolute necessity, to which nothing could make any difference. Or Metaphysical necessity, determined by all things.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
     Full Idea: It seems natural to claim that light rays moving in straight lines is contingent but a priori. Scientists stipulate that they are the standard by which we measure straightness, but their appropriateness for this task is a contingent feature of the world.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 02.9)
     A reaction: This resembles the metre rule in Paris. It is contingent that something is a certain way, so we make being that way a conventional truth, which can therefore be known via the convention, rather than via the contingent fact.