display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world. | |
From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds. |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: An alternative conception of a possible world says it is constituted, not by the totality of facts, or of how things might be, but by the totality of circumstances, or how things might turn out. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
A reaction: The general idea is to make a possible world more limited than in Idea 15068. It only contains properties arising from 'engagement with the world', and won't include timeless sentences. It is a bunch of possibilities, not of actualities? |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We are accustomed think of the actual world as the totality of facts, and so we think of any possible world as being like the actual world in settling the truth-value of every single proposition. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
A reaction: Hence it is normal to refer to a possible world as a 'maximal' set of of propositions (sentences, etc). See Idea 15069 for his proposed alternative view. |