display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Once the obstacle of the deeply rooted conviction that necessary truths should be knowable a priori is removed, ...causal necessity is (pretheoretically) the very paradigm of necessity, in ordinary usage and in dictionaries. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VII) | |
A reaction: The a priori route seems to lead to logical necessity, just by doing a priori logic, and also to metaphysical necessity, by some sort of intuitive vision. This is a powerful idea of Shoemaker's (implied, of course, in Kripke). |
4818 | People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Those who are ignorant of true causes make complete confusion - thinking that trees might talk just as well as men, that men might be formed from stones as well as seed, and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 08 n2) | |
A reaction: Spinoza himself can be guilty of this, but it strikes me as a key idea. Humean scepticism about causation seems to me the product of eighteenth century ignorance about the mechanisms of cause and effect which have since been uncovered by science. |
20310 | Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 17 s) | |
A reaction: These may be the wisest words I have yet found on conceivability and possibility. My example is imagining a bonfire on the moon, which seems possible until you fully grasp what fire is. |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: We could use 'conceivable' to say it is not provable that it is not the case, or we could use it to say that it is compatible with what we know. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: Rather significant, since the first one would seem to allow in a great deal that the second one would rule out. Any disproof of some natural possibility founders on the remark that 'you never know'. |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: We have abundant empirical evidence that when we can imagine some phenomenal situation, e.g., imagine things appearing certain ways, such a situation could actually exist. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: There seem to be good reasons for holding the opposite view too. We can imagine gold appearing to be all sorts of colours, but that doesn't make it possible. What does empirical evidence really tell us here? |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Imaginability can give us access to conceptual possibility, when we come to believe situations to be conceptually possible by reflecting on their descriptions and seeing no contradiction or incoherence. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: If take the absence of contradiction to indicate 'logical' possibility, but the absence of incoherence is more interesting, even if it is a bit vague. He is talking of 'situations', which I take to be features of reality. A priori synthetic? |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It is possible to conceive what is not possible. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: The point here is that, while we cannot clearly conceive the impossible in a world like mathematics, we can conceive of impossible perceptions in the physical world, such as a bonfire burning under water. |