display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
Full Idea: The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1) | |
A reaction: [She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility? |
10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: For many philosophers the logical notions of possibility and necessity are exceptions to a general scepticism, perhaps because they have been reduced to model theory, via set theory. Thus Φ is logically possible if there is a model that satisfies it. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 7.1) | |
A reaction: Initially this looks a bit feeble, like an empiricist only believing what they actually see right now, but the modern analytical philosophy project seems to be the extension of logical accounts further and further into what we intuit about modality. |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
Full Idea: There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows. | |
From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1) | |
A reaction: Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible. |
10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The fact that the 'myth' of possible worlds happens to produce the correct modal logic is itself a phenomenon in need of explanation. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 7.4) | |
A reaction: The claim that it produces 'the' correct modal logic seems to beg a lot of questions, given the profusion of modal systems. This is a problem with any sort of metaphysics which invokes fictionalism - what were those particular fictions responding to? |