display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
10 ideas
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
Full Idea: Rumfitt argues that there is a distinctive notion of necessity implicated in the notion of logical consequence. | |
From: report of Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2 |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The central characteristic mark of metaphysical necessity is that a metaphysical possibility respects the actual identities of things - in a capacious sense of 'thing'. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.4) | |
A reaction: He contrast this with logical necessity, and concludes that some truths are metaphysically but not logically necessary, such as 'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus'. Personally I like the idea of a 'necessity-maker', so that fits. |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that any statement that is logically necessary (in the present sense) is knowable a priori. ..If a statement is logically necessary, its negation will yield a contradiction, but that does not imply that someone could know it. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dorothy Edgington, who holds the opposite view. Rumfitt largely defends McFetridge's view (q.v.). |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: By the notion of 'logical necessity' I mean that there is a sense of 'necessary' for which 'It is necessary that A' implies and is implied by 'It is logically contradictory that not A'. ...From this, logical necessity is implicated in logical consequence. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt expresses a commitment to classical logic at this point. We will need to be quite sure what we mean by 'contradiction', which will need a clear notion of 'truth'.... |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: While Fine suggests defining a narrow notion of logical necessity in terms of metaphysical necessity by 'restriction' (to logical truths that can be defined in non-modal terms), this seems unpromising for broad logical necessity, which is modal. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He cites Kit Fine 2002. Rumfitt glosses the non-modal definitions as purely formal. The metaphysics lurks somewhere in the proof. |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: I accept the widely held thesis that S5 is the logic of logical necessity. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.4 n16) | |
A reaction: It seems plausible that S5 is also the logic of metaphysical necessity, but that does not make them the same thing. The two types of necessity have two different grounds. |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Two possibilities are incompatible when no possibility determines both. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as just the right sort of language for building up a decent metaphysical picture of the world, which needs to incorporate possibilities as well as actualities. |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers describe the colour scarlet as a determination of the determinable red; since the ways the world might be are naturally taken to be properties of the world, it helps to bear this analogy in mind. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This fits nicely with the disposition accounts of modality which I favour. Hence being 'coloured' is a real property of objects, even in the absence of the name of its specific colour. |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A world is usually taken to be a fully determinate way that things could have been; but then one might seriously wonder whether anyone is capable of 'considering' such a thing at all. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This has always worried me. If I say 'maybe my coat is in the car', I would hate to think that I had to be contemplating some entire possible world (including all the implications of my coat not being on the hat stand). |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Possibilities are things of the same general character as possible worlds, on one popular conception of the latter. They differ from worlds, though, in that they are not required to be fully determinate or complete. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6) | |
A reaction: A rather promising approach to such things, even though a possibility is fairly determinate at its core, but very vague at the edges. It is possible that the UK parliament might be located in Birmingham, for example. Is this world 'complete'? |