Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Alan Turing and Scott Soames

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


4 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
     Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
     A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic...
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
     Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
     A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
     Full Idea: None of Kripke's many achievements is more important than his breaking the spell of the linguistic as the source of philosophically important modalities.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.186)
     A reaction: Put like that, Kripke may have had the single most important thought of modern times. I take good philosophy to be exactly the same as good scientific theorising, in that it all arises out of the nature of reality (and I include logic in that).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
     Full Idea: For the Kripkean possible states of the world are not alternate concrete universes, but abstract objects. Metaphysically possible world-states are maximally complete ways the real concrete universe could have been.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.167)
     A reaction: This is probably clearer about the Kripkean view than Kripke ever is, but then that is part of Soames's mission. It sounds like the right way to conceive possible worlds. At least there is some commitment there, rather than instrumentalism about them.