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15883
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Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
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Full Idea:
Leibniz sets up increasingly stringent conditions possible worlds must meet. The weakest is non-contradiction, for truths of reason; then sufficient reason, for rational worlds; then identity of indiscernibles, for duplicates; then compossibility.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 4
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A reaction:
[my summary of a very nice two pages by Harré] God is the source of the principles which do the narrowing down.
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7837
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Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
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Full Idea:
In his early writings the principle of sufficient reason made it difficult for Leibniz to conceive of possible things;...raising this to possible worlds means God does not choose things that are evil, but chooses a world which must have evil in it.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.14
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A reaction:
Where we think of possible worlds as explanations for conditional and counterfactual truths (I take it), Leibniz developed the original idea as part of his huge effort to achieve a consistent theodicy.
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12904
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If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
I can as little conceive of different varieties of myself as of a circle whose diameters are not all of equal length. These variations would all be distinct one from another, and thus one of these varieties of myself would necessarily not be me.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05.13)
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A reaction:
This seems to be, at the very least, a rejection of any idea that I could have a 'counterpart'. It is unclear, though, where he would place a version of himself who learned a new language, or who might have had, but didn't have, a haircut.
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11981
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If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If the life of some person, or something went differently than it does, nothing would stop us from saying that it would be another person, or another possible universe which God had chosen. So truly it would be another individual.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.14)
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A reaction:
Plantinga quotes this as an example of 'worldbound individuals'. This sort of remark leads to people saying that Leibniz believes all properties are essential, since they assume that his notion of essence is bound up with identity. But is it?
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13080
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Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
When Leibniz has the grounds of de re counterfactuals in mind, a counterpart picture, we have argued, is at work.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.2.2
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A reaction:
If Leibniz were a 'superessentialist', then individuals would be totally worldbound (because their relations would be essential). Cover/Hawthorne argue that he is just a 'strong' essentialist, allowing possible counterparts. Quite persuasive.
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5039
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If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106)
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A reaction:
A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked?
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