Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Gabriel M.A. Segal and Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J

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3 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
     Full Idea: It is metaphysically necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but not logically necessary, since logical deduction could not reveal its truth, and it is not epistemologically necessary, as the ancient Greeks didn't know the identity. (Natural necessity?)
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6)
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
     Full Idea: Since conceivability is the chief method of assessing the claims of metaphysical necessity, I think such claims are incautious.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects.
     From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46)
     A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is!