Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, David Kaplan and Gabriel M.A. Segal

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6 ideas

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11971 The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: If we adopt the bare particular metaphysical view, we have a simple solution to the transworld identification problem: we identify by bare particulars.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.98)
     A reaction: See Ideas 11969 and 11970 on this idea. The problem with bare particulars is that they can change their properties utterly, so that Aristotle in the actual world can be a poached egg in some possible world. We need essences.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11973 Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: An extremely vivid person might have no counterparts, and Da Vinci seems to me to have more than one essence. Bertrand Russell is clearly the counterpart of at least three distinct persons in some more plausible world.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.100)
     A reaction: Lewis prefers the notion that there is at most one counterpart, the 'closest' entity is some world. I think he also claims there is at least one counterpart. I like Kaplan's relaxed attitude to these things, which has more explanatory power.
11972 Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: I prefer to think of essence as a transworld heir line, rather than as the more familiar collection of properties, because the latter too much suggests the idea of a fixed and final essential description.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.100)
     A reaction: He is sympathetic to the counterpart idea, and close to Lewis's view of essences, as the intersection of counterparts. I like his rebellion against fixed and final descriptions, but am a bit doubtful about his basic idea. Causation should be involved.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11990 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
     A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.
9668 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
     A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.
11991 If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
     From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
     A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?