display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: A thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 33) | |
A reaction: A very good remark. Growing up is largely a realisation of the necessity of human affairs that you thought could be otherwise. (Forgive the pessimism!) As metaphysics, I find this appealing, too. |
4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
Full Idea: The common notion of 'contingency' is for Spinoza an illusion, which derives from the fact that our view of reality is often inadequate and incomplete. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.8 | |
A reaction: The crux is if there could another universe with different natural laws. Spinoza is in no position to deny the possibility. Cosmologists assume it is possible, and run computer simulations to test it. There is 'metaphysical' and 'natural' necessity. |
4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary; ..hence, it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or to the past, as contingent. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 44) | |
A reaction: A very interesting claim, which seems to be central to rationalism. The empiricist response must be that imagination (which is founded on experience) is a better guide to metaphysical status than pure reason can ever be. |