Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Melvin Fitting, Daniel C. Dennett and Jenny Teichmann

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3 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
     Full Idea: The besetting foible of philosophers is mistaking failures of imagination for insights into necessity.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: You say you cannot imagine that p, and therefore declare that p is impossible. Mightn't that be hubris?
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
     Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4)
     A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others.