display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: The actual world is a maximally consistent state-of-affairs combination involving all and only the existent objects, which in turn exist because they are maximally consistent property combinations. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: [This extends Idea 7688]. This seems to invite the standard objections to the coherence theory of truth, such as Ideas 5422 and 4745. Is 'maximal consistency' merely a test for actuality, rather than an account of what actuality is? |
15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds. | |
From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions? |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: The actual world can be defined as a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs, or maximally consistent states-of-affairs combination. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A key part of Jacquette's program of deriving ontological results from the foundations of logic. Is the counterfactual situation of my pen being three centimetres to the left of its current position a "less consistent" situation than the actual one? |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Many modal logicians in their philosophical moments have raised doubts about whether structures of propositions not associated with the actual world deserved to be called worlds at all. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A good question. Consistency is obviously required, but we also need a lot of propositions before we would consider it a 'world'. Very remote but consistent worlds quickly become unimaginable. Does that matter? |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
Full Idea: Conventional modal semantics, in which all logically possible worlds are defined in terms of maximally consistent proposition sets, has no choice except to allow that the actual world is the world we experience in sensation, or that we inhabit. | |
From: Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Jacquette dislikes this because he is seeking an account of ontology that doesn't, as so often, merely reduce to epistemology (e.g. Berkeley). See Idea 7691 for his preferred account. |