Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Richard T.W. Arthur, Robert C. Stalnaker and Peter Unger

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4 ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: My view is that if there were a nonmodal analysis of the modal concepts, that would be a sure sign that we were on the wrong track. Necessity and possibility are fundamental concepts, like truth and existence.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: The mystery of modality is tied up with the mystery of time (which is a very big mystery indeed). You get a nice clear grip on the here and now, but time and motion whisk you away to something else. Modality concerns the something else.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
     A reaction: This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea.
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Conceptual possibilities are just (metaphysical) possibilities that we can conceive of.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Modal concepts are central to our understanding of the world - the actual world - and understanding them should not require extravagant metaphysical commitments.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1)
     A reaction: I agree. Personally I think powers and dispositions do the job nicely. You just have to embrace Leibniz's emphasis on the active nature of reality, and the implausible metaphysics starts to recede.