Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Ofra Magidor and Albert Casullo

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2 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
     Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
     Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.