display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The concept is always possible if it does not contradict itself (the logical mark of possibility). Yet it can be an empty concept. ...We cannot infer from the possibility of the concept (logical possibility) to the possibility of the thing (real). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B624/A596 n) |
| 5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Whether the field of possibility is greater than the field that contains everything actual, and whether the latter is in turn greater than the set of that which is necessary, are proper questions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B282/A230) | |
| A reaction: A good overview. Is the actual necessary (i.e. is only the actual possible?)? Why is the non-actual possible? What would a theory look like which explains why the necessary is necessary, the actual actual, and the possible possible? A religion? |
| 5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The analytic mark of possibility is the fact that mere positings (realities) do not generate a contradiction. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B630/A602) | |
| A reaction: I think this is wrong. I would offer self-evident absurdity (but with no actual contradiction) as another analytic mark of possibility. Natural possibility may coincide with metaphysical possibility. Human thought does not determine possibilities. |
| 21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: That the concept of a thing is possible (not self-contradictory) is not yet sufficient for assuming the possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the concept). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 382 Intro I) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an inkling of Kripke's a posteriori scientific necessities, which place far greater restrictions on the possibilies of what we seem to have conceived, in addition to the mere need for consistency. |