Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Henri Bergson and Willard Quine
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26 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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10921
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Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
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14645
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To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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12188
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Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
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9001
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Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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9201
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Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
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15090
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Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
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10927
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Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
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10924
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Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
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4577
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There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
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8206
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Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
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8483
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Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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15782
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Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
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9014
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Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
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15725
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Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
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15722
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Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
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22432
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Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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15719
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We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
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15721
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Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
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15724
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Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
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15720
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What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
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2796
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For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
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8856
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Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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13589
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Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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12443
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Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
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9203
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We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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13588
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A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
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