Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Archimedes, Bob Hale and Gideon Rosen

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34 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
19290 Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
19286 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
19288 Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
19285 Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
19287 Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12432 Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
12434 Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
12435 The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
19282 It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
12433 If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
12436 Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
19276 The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
19293 Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
19294 If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
19279 What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
19299 Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]