Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Augustin-Louis Cauchy, Gideon Rosen and Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R
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15 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
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14094
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The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
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18850
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'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
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18858
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Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
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18857
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Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
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18856
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Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848
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Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855
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Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101
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Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853
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A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745
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A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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18747
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The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748
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Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746
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Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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18750
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Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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