Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Benjamin Constant, Karl Popper and Frank Jackson
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12 ideas
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
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14360
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Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
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14288
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'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
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13769
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Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
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13858
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The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
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14289
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There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
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14353
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Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
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14354
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When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
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14355
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(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
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14358
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In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
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14359
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Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
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14357
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Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
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14356
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We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
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