Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bertrand Russell, Johann Gottfried Herder and Brian Ellis
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
20 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8375
|
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
|
6099
|
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
13576
|
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12668
|
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16490
|
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
22308
|
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
|
5479
|
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
21533
|
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
12197
|
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell]
|
14450
|
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
22303
|
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12687
|
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
5483
|
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
13570
|
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
|
5447
|
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
5476
|
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
5478
|
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
|
14460
|
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
5482
|
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
|