Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Charles Parsons, Kit Fine and Nathan Salmon
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10 ideas
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
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Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
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Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
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14687
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Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
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The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
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Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
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The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
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14672
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Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
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You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
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