Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David J.Chalmers, Michael Jubien and George Boole
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
24 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16424
|
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
|
16425
|
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
13394
|
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
16426
|
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119
|
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
13391
|
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
|
13374
|
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118
|
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
|
11108
|
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
|
11111
|
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
13956
|
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
13963
|
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
|
16473
|
Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
|
19258
|
Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
2407
|
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105
|
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
|
11107
|
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
|
11106
|
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
|
11112
|
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
|
11109
|
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
|
11113
|
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
|
13389
|
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
|
13390
|
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110
|
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
|