Combining Philosophers

Ideas for David J.Chalmers, Michael Jubien and George Boole

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24 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16424 Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
16425 Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
13394 Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
16426 How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
13391 Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
13374 To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
13956 Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
13963 Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
16473 Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
19258 Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
2407 One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
13389 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
13390 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]