Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David M. Rosenthal, Ian Rumfitt and Gideon Rosen
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20 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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14532
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A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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18849
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Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
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18850
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'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
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18858
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Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
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14094
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The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
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18857
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Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
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18856
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Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
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18816
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Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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18848
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Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
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12193
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Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
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12200
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A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
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18825
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S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
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12202
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Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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18824
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Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
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18828
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If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
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18855
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Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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14101
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Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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18853
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A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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12203
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If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
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18821
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Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
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