Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Diogenes Laertius, Joseph Melia and Daniel C. Dennett
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10 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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5738
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We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
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5732
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'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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5739
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Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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2526
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Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
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3802
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Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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5734
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Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
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5742
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In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
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5743
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If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
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5749
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Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
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5751
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The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
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