Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Empedocles, Willard Quine and John L. Pollock
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12 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
10921
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Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
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8822
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Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645
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To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12188
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Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
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9001
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Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201
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Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
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15090
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Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
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10927
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Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
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10924
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Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
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4577
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There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
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8206
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Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
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8483
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Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
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