Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Epicurus, Archelaus and David Lewis

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31 ideas

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]