Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Giordano Bruno, Bob Hale and John L. Pollock
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25 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822
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Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
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15086
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Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
19290
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Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
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8261
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Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
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15080
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'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
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15081
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A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
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19286
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'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
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19288
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Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15082
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Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15088
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Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
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15085
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'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
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19285
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Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
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19287
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Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12432
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Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
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12434
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Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
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12435
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The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
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19282
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It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
12433
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If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15087
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Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
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12436
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Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
19276
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The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
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19293
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Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
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19294
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If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
19279
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What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
19299
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Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
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