Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Harré,R./Madden,E.H, Novalis and Timothy Williamson

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28 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14625 Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
15290 What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
15291 There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15230 Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
15214 Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden]
15221 The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
15224 A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden]
15232 Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden]
15288 People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden]
15289 Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15231 Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden]
15234 There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14623 Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15260 Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14531 Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
15233 If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]
15242 Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15216 Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden]
15235 There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15228 Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden]
21621 We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
15252 If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
18925 If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron]