Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hesiod, Friedrich Nietzsche and Ian Rumfitt
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14 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
7134
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Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
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24077
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Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532
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A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18816
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Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193
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Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
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12200
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A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
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18825
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S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
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12202
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Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
7186
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There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
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4528
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For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
18828
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If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
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18824
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Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203
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If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
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18821
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Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
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