Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hesiod, Friedrich Nietzsche and Ian Rumfitt

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14 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
7134 Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
24077 Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18816 Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
18825 S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
7186 There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
4528 For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
18828 If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
18824 Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
18821 Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]