Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jeremiah, Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R and Immanuel Kant
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17 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
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18797
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Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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5594
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Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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18795
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A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant]
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5566
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Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant]
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5613
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The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant]
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21410
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That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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6181
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Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
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18796
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Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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23461
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Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M]
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14710
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Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
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16256
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For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
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5524
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Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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18745
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A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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18747
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The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
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18748
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Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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18746
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Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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18750
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Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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